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Damages from a Third Party for
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in Ohio
FLORENCE G. DENTON*
An early Ohio case1 is cited in a note in a law treatise2 as the
leading case in support of the principle that a mortgagee may
recover from third parties in an action on the case "on the theory
that the wrong is done to property of which plaintiff has
neither the possession nor the right of possession, and, since
trespass, detinue, or trover will not lie, the law for the injury to
plaintiff's rights will afford a remedy by an action on the case."
A recent Ohio case3 very broadly declares that a mortgagee,
whether he is in possession or has the right of possession, may
bring an action for the impairment of his mortgage security,
and, since his action is based on the impairment of his mort-
gage security, he need not allege or prove the insolvency of the
mortgagor. It, therefore, would appear that the law of Ohio
in reference to this very important question should be well
settled. An examination of the cases, however, shows that many
questions which arise concerning the right of a mortgagee to
recover from a third person for damage to the mortgage se-
curity have not been decided, and that the theory on which the
decided cases are based is not clearly defined or well settled.
What is the basis of the action? And closely connected, what
is the measure of recovery by the mortgagee? Is it necessary to
bring a foreclosure action to establish damages? The theory of
mortgages in Ohio is that the mortgagor retains the legal title
* A~sistant State Counsel, Ohio, Home Owners' Loan Corporation.
1 Allifon v. McCune, 15 Ohio 7z6 (i846); Carpenter v. Canal, 35 Ohio
St. 307 (1880).
2 11 c.J.4.
City of Toledo v. Brown, 13o Ohio St. 513 (1936).
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and the mortgagee has a lien as security for the payment of the
debt at least until condition broken, and, as to third parties,
even subsequent to condition broken4. None of the Ohio cases
mentions this lien theory as affecting the decision in reference
to recovery against third persons but it is submitted that this
theory furnishes the background of the Ohio decisions which
carefully avoid awarding damages on the basis of injury to the
physical mortgaged property. The Ohio courts have based the
recovery of the mortgagee on: the lessening of the mortgage
"security" of another "to the extent of any actual injury
sustained"'; the value of fixtures removed, "if thereby the
security is rendered insufficient" and "if it be afterward found
that the value of the remaining security is insufficient to pay the
purchase money due"8 ; "the impairment of his mortgage se-
curity, and, since his action is based on the impairment of his
mortgage security, he need not allege or prove the insolvency
of the mortgagor"7 ; the "mortgage security" cannot be taken
by public authorities without compensation8.
A simple and direct meaning of the term "mortgage
security" defines it as the physical "res" subject to the mortgage
lien. Another meaning of the term seems to include only such
incidents which are necessary to the "mortgage as a security"
for the mortgage debt9 . It is not clear in what sense the Ohio
courts have used this term. There appears to be some hazy,
very flexible meaning attached to the term "mortgage security"
as distinguished from the mortgaged property. In the case of
Smith v. A lticka the court appears to have attached to this term
4 Martin v. Alter, 42 Ohio St. 94 (1884); Kerr v. Lydecher, 5 Ohio St.
240 (1894); Ely v. McGuire, z Ohio 223 (1826); Philly v. Sanders, ii
Ohio St. 490 (18.6o); Allen v. Everly, 24 Ohio St. 97 (1873); Bradfield v.
Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316 (i902).
5 Allison v. McCune, supra, note i; Building and Savings Co. v. Cincin-
nati, I2 Ohio Dec. 218 (19o).
6 Smith v. Altik, 24 Ohio St. 369 (1873).
City of Toledo v. Brown, supra, note 3.
'State Avenue Loan and Building Co. v. Spiegel, 131 Ohio St. 488
(1936).
9 Jacsonv. Turrell, 39 N.J.L. 329 (877).
9a See note 6, supra.
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the meaning that the mortgagee must first foreclose to de-
termine whether the security was rendered insufficient-by the
acts of the third parties to pay the money. The requirement
of a foreclosure action to determine the insufficiency of the
security in order to ascertain whether there has been "actual
injury sustained" is not mentioned in the earlier case of Allison
v. McCune9 b. The principles announced in City of Toledo v.
Browzon are broad enough not to require a foreclosure sale to
establish the insufficiency of the security as a prerequisite to re-
covery. The peculiar fact situation in that case, however, led
the court to advise that the mortgagee join as parties defendant
in the foreclosure action the mortgagor and the City of Toledo,
which city had appropriated part of the mortgaged property
for a public use and had compensated the mortgagor in the full
sum of $23,5oo.oo, the damages assessed in the appropriate
proceedings, so that the amount of recovery to which plaintiff
was entitled might be ascertained. Had it not been for the cir-
cumstance that full compensation had already been paid the
mortgagor without notice to the mortgagee, a direct recovery
against the city without the necessity of a prior foreclosure
action is indicated by the language of the court. Jones, J. states
that "the many reported cases touching the impairment of a
mortgage security evince the difficulty of adopting any rigid and
abstract rule that will govern the remedy that should be em-
ployed in individual cases. We are content to announce the
principle that should apply to the case at bar." In the case of
State Avenue Loan and Building Company v. Spiegel"0 the
mortgagor had obtained a judgment against the City of Cincin-
nati in a suit for damages caused to his property by excavations
made by the city causing his property to slide and the foundation
and walls to crack. The mortgagee was not a party to the action
at the time the judgment was obtained but was later made a
party defendant and permitted to file an answer which alleged
9b See note I, supra.
'0 See note 3, supra.10 State Avenue Loan and Building Co. v. Spiegel, supra, note 8.
164 LAW JOURNAL - MARCH, 1937
that the damages caused to the premises had impaired its mort-
gage security and asked payment of the money in the hands of
the court as partial satisfaction of its mortgage. The assignee
of the judgment contested the mortgagee's rights. The court
held that as between the mortgagor and mortgagee the mort-
gagee was entitled to the proceeds of the judgment, and that
since the assignee was not an innocent purchaser for value that
he acquired no greater rights than the original mortgagor and
that the court would not order foreclosure proceedings in the
hope that the mortgage might be satisfied by sale of the prem-
ises. It, therefore, appears that the Supreme Court of Ohio does
not consider a foreclosure action establishing a deficiency due
on the mortgage to be an essential element to the mortgagee's
right to recover damages for the impairment of the mortgage
security, and that the requirement of a foreclosure proceeding
will be made on equitable grounds where the facts of the case
require it.
It is submitted that whether or not the remaining security is
ample to pay the debt is not a valid test for determining the
amount of recovery by the mortgagee. If the value of the re-
maining security is to be considered, the solvency or insolvency
of the mortgagor also should be considered, and it is thus clearly
apparent that those elements totally disregard the fundamental
principle that the mortgagee has a right which is infringed by a
person who injures the mortgaged property and for which he is
entitled to recover in a tort action against the wrongdoer.
Another problem to be considered in determining the basis
of the action is whether the act causing the injury to the mort-
gaged premises must be wilful, with the intent to injure the
mortgagee, or whether the mortgagee can recover for negligent
acts. All of the Ohio cases involve the intentional injury to the
mortgaged property, i. e., removal of fixtures or taking of
property for public use. It is suggested, however, that the
reasoning of the Ohio decisions as well as the nature of the
action, which is ex delicto permits recovery for negligent in-
juries. No logical nor practical reasons appear to support the
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New York rule1 in reference to negligent injuries. It often
occurs that serious injuries are done to mortgaged premises by
negligence of third parties, such as by blasting, trucks and auto-
mobiles running into mortgaged houses, and of course in the
case of chattel mortgaged property the greatest source of
danger is from negligent injuries.
BAsIs OF ACTION
It is interesting to consider the decisions in other juris-
dictions to determine the basis of the action for recovery by the
mortgagee, and the measure of damages for such recovery. The
historical background of the action by the mortgagee appears
to be based on the theory that although the mortgagee did not
have the legal title or the right to possession on which to base
an action in trespass "quare clausium fregit"", that neverthe-
les the mortgagee had a contingent interest in the mortgaged
property which would support a special "action on the case"' .
Such an action in modern times is understood to be an action ex
delicto and is always classed among the actions in tort. It,
therefore, appears that the action should lie for injuries caused
by both wilful, fraudulent acts, by negligent acts, and by acts
where there is liability without negligence or intention to harm
under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher'4.
There is a diversity of authority, however, concerning the
question whether negligent injuries form the basis of an action
by the mortgagee. The New York rule denies recovery against
a third person for negligently injuring the mortgaged premises
whereby the mortgagee loses his security. 5 The New York
rule requires that the defendant know of the existence of plain-
tiff's mortgage, and that he wilfully and intentionally impair
11 See note 15 infra.
12 Goodivgv. Shea, 103 Mass. 360 (1869).
"3 Allison v. McCune, supra, note I ; Ehrman v. Oates, Ioi Ala. 604, 14
So. 361 (1893); Morgan v. Waters, io6 N.Y.S. 882 (1907).
14 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
1 Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio (N.Y.) 232 (1846).
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the security of the lien.'" The reason for this rule does not ap-
pear to be well founded. The per curiam opinion in the early
case of Yates v. Joyce" states: "Plaintiff has sustained damage
by the act of the defendant, which he alleges was done fraudu-
lently, and with intent to injure him. It is the-pride of the
common law that wherever it recognizes a private right, it also
gives a remedy for the wilful violation of it." Quaere, is it not
just as much the pride of the law that wherever it recognizes
a right it gives a remedy for the negligent violation of it? In
the case of Jackson v. Brandon Realty Company8 the security
was impaired by the defendant's intentionally taking away a
part of the realty but the evidence fell short of showing that
the defendant knew of plaintiff's mortgage, therefore, the
plaintiff was denied recovery. Since every person is assumed to
be responsible for the natural consequences of his acts," it is not
logical nor just that the mortgagee be denied recovery merely
because the wrongdoer had no knowledge of the lien.
The weight of authority holds that a mortgagee may re-
cover from a third person who has injured the mortgaged prem-
ises either intentionally,"0 negligently,' or in cases where there
is absolute liability,22 without intention or negligence. Negli-
gent injuries most often occur to mortgaged chattels, especially
automobiles. The cases universally hold that the chattel mort-
gagee may recover for negligent injuries.
16 Yates v. Joyce, i I Johns. 135 ( 814) ; Gardner v. Heartt, supra, note
15; Ogden v. Busse, 86 N.Y.S. io98, 92 App. D. 143 (19o4); Jackson v.
Brandon Realty Co., ioo N.Y.S. 1005 (19o6); Cootle v. Wright, 25I N.Y.S.
699 (193).
11 Yates v. Joyce, supra, note x6.
18 Jackson v. Brandon, supra, note 16.
19 Ridenour v. State, 38 Ohio St. z72 (18 82) ; Searles v. State, 6 Ohio
C.C. 331 (1892).
20 Jackson v. Turrell, 39 N.J.L., 329 (1877); Mathews v. Siliby Broi.,
2oi N.W. 94 (Sup. Ct. Ia. 1924); Morgan v. Gilbert, 2 Fed. 835 (C. C. W.
D. Mich. 188o); Arnold v. Brood, 62 Pac. 577 (i9oo); Hurlinger v. Cen-
tral Trust Co., 94 Fed. 788 (8th Cir. 1899).
21 Jackson v. Turrell, supra, note 9.
2 James v. Worcester, 141 Mass. 361, 5 N.E. 826 (1886); Jersey City
v. Kiernan, 5o N.J.L. 246 (1888).2sHarris v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 19o N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319
(1925); Lloyd v. Northern R. R. Co., 61 A.L.R. 307, 18I Pac. 29 (Wash.
1919).
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MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The measure of damages established by the Massachusetts
courts, known as the Massachusetts Rule, is clear cut and easily
ascertainable. The mortgagee's damages are measured by the
extent of the injury to the property, thus allowing to the mort-
gagee the full amount of damages to the physical res.2" The
right of the mortgagee to recover does not depend upon the
sufficiency or insufficiency of his security. The mortgagee has a
right to his security unimpaired until his whole debt is paid 5 he
cannot be deprived of any substantial part of his entire security
without full redress therefor5 even though in its damaged con-
dition it is of sufficient value to satisfy the mortgage debt2 5.
The right to recover, further, is not limited by whether the
mortgagee be in or out of possession or whether there has been
a breach of the condition of the mortgage.26
It is possible that the Massachusetts Rule as to the measure
of damages is directly based upon the Massachusetts theory of
mortgages, that as between the mortgagor and mortgagee the
legal title passes to the mortgagee in order to give the mort-
gagee an effectual security by the pledge of real estate for the
payment of a debt." The rule is practical, however, regardless
of whether the lien theory or legal title theory of mortgages
applies, for as stated in Gooding v. Shea,8 the claim "when re-
covered applies in payment pro tanto of the mortgage debt, and
thus, ultimately for the benefit of the mortgagor, if he redeem
... Due satisfaction will discharge all claims if made to a party
having a prior right." If it is considered that this rule is based
upon the theory that as between the mortgagor and mortgagee
the legal title is in the mortgagee, this rule is applicable in Ohio
24 Gooding v. Shea, supra, note 12; James v. Worcester, supra, note 2z;
Wilslow v. Moulton, 127 Mass. 509 (1879); Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass.
491 0I879).
25 Gooding v. Shea, supra, note I2; Delano v. Smith, 2o6 Mass. 365
(i9IO); Byron v. Chapin, 13 Mass. 308 (1873).
213 Wlislow v. Moulton, supra, note 24; Searle v. Sawyer, supra, note 24.
2 Ewer v. Hobbs, 5 Metc. I (Mass. 1842).
28 Gooding v. Shea, supra, note i z.
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in all cases where the condition of the mortgage has been
broken.2"
In New York, a lien theory state, the rule is that the
measure of damages is the diminution in the market value of
the whole property by reason of the injury, unless such amount
is greater than the reasonable cost of repairing the injury, in
which case such cost only will be allowed." The New York
courts had held that the insolvency of the mortgagor is imma-
terial, 1 overruling an earlier decision 2 as to the necessity of in-
solvency. Under this rule it follows that foreclosure of the
mortgage to determine the deficiency is not necessary. It,
therefore, appears that in New York, a strict "lien theory"
state, the measure of damages is almost identical with that in
Massachusetts, i. e. the recovery of the mortgagee is based on
the diminution of the value of the physical property.
The rules in other states are not so definite nor so easily
understood or aplied. In a leading New Jersey case the court
held that in such an action, the damages recoverable are to be
measured by the injury to the mortgage as a security. In the
same case the court repudiated the suggestion that the insolv-
ency of the mortgagor must be proved and that a foreclosure
should be required to determine the deficiency. The evidence
showed that both before and after the injury the premises were
ample security for the first mortgage but insufficient to meet,
also, the whole of the second mortgage, and that, consequently,
the entire depreciation resulting from defendant's acts was so
much stripped from the security of the second mortgagee. It,
therefore, appears that the sole distinction between this rule,
and the Massachusetts and New York rule is that the sufficiency
of the remaining security was taken into consideration in de-
termining the measure of recovery. Quaere, would not the
same ultimate result be accomplished had the first mortgagee
29 See note 4, supra.
30 Ogden Lumber Co. v. Bussee, 86 N.Y.S. io98 (I9O4).
31 Ibid.
32 Gardner v. Heart, 3 Denio 232 (1846).
33 Jackson v. Turrell, 39 N.J.L. 329 (1877).
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have recovered damages measured by the extent of the injury
to the property, and thus discharged the first mortgage debt
pro tanto and thereby improved the security held by the second
mortgagee? Other cases adopt the rule that the mortgagee may
recover for the "injury to the security."34 Just as in the Ohio
cases, it is not clear what elements are included, and what ele-
ments rejected by such test.
PARTIES TO THE ACTION
It is clear that the only necessary parties to the action are
the mortgagee plaintiff and the tortfeasor defendant." It ap-
pears, however, that it may be desirable in certain cases to join
other lien holders or the mortgagor either as plaintiff or de-
fendant,"6 and the court in the exercise of its equitable powers
may in a proper case, if the objection is made in time, require
the joinder of other parties having an interest in the mortgaged
premises. 7 Although a mortgagor and a second or third mort-
gagee as well as a first mortgagee also have sufficient interest
in the estate to maintain an action for such injury," the defend-
ant cannot resist either by showing that another may also sue,
or has sued." "The stranger, however, is not liable to all,
successively. The superior right is in the party having superior-
ity of tide. The demand is not personal to either the mortgagor
or any of the mortgagees, but arises out of and pertains to the
:1' Mathews v. Silsby, supra, note zo; Huringer v. Central Trust Co., 94
Fed. 788 (8th Cir. i899); Morgan v. Gilbert, z Fed. 835 (C. C. W. D.
Mich. I88o); Arnold v. Broad, 6z Pac. 577 (Colo. I9OO); Planters Bank v.
Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S.C. I6, 41 A.L.R. 592 (19z5); Sloss-Shef-
field Skeet and Iron Co. v. Wilkes, z3i Ala. 511, i65 So. 754 (1936);
Jersey City v. Kierman, 50 N.J.L. 246 (1888).
" Craig v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 197 S.W. 141 (S.C. Mo.
1917) and cases cited supra, note 34-
"' Carpenter v. Canal Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 (i88o); Sloss-Sheffield v.
Wilkes, supra, note 34-.
11 Commercial Securities Co. v. Mast, 29 Pac. (2d.) 635 (Oregon 1934);
Craig v. Kansas, supra, note 35.
11Lighteap v. Bradley, i86 Il. 51o (19oo); Van Dyke v. Grd. Trunk
R. R., 78 At. 958 (1911).
1' Gooding v. Shea, supra, note 12.
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estate; and, when recovered, applies in payment pro tanto of
the mortgage debt, and thus ultimately for the benefit of the
mortgagor if he redeems.... Due satisfaction will discharge
all the claims if made to a party having the prior right.14 0 A
reasonable satisfaction m ade in good faith to a prior mortgagee
for damage done to the mortgaged property, bars an action
brought for such damage by a subsequent mortgagee.4' Recov-
ery in an action by a mortgagor does not bar a subsequent
recovery by a mortgagee of realty. 2 A recovery by either the
mortgagor or mortgagee of chattels, in the absence of fraud
or collusion is a bar to an action by the other. 3 This rule in
reference to chattel mortgages is based on the law of bailments
gnd has no applicability to real estate mortgages.
40 Ibid.
'
1Byromv. Chapin, II 3 Mass. 308 (1873).
42 Toledo v. Brown, supra, note 3; Chauteon v. Baughton, ioo Mo. 406,
13 S.W. 877 (1890).
4 Harris v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 19o N.C. 480, 13o S.E. 319
(1925); Miller v. Hartman, 145 So. 786 (La. 1933).
